Belgian Authorities Probe Alleged Transfer of Chip Technology to China

Authorities stopped a 52-year-old dual national at Brussels Airport on May 10 as he prepared to depart for Beijing, suspecting him of moving confidential semiconductor data to China. The Belgian-Chinese researcher faces investigation for allegedly transferring intellectual property and trade secrets from BelGaN, a now-defunct semiconductor manufacturer, to a Chinese enterprise. He was formally arrested the day after his detention and currently awaits trial in custody at Oudenaarde prison.

According to Belgian prosecutors, the suspect previously occupied a senior research position at BelGaN while simultaneously holding a directorship at a Chinese firm engaged in comparable manufacturing activities. The Chinese company was launched several months following his arrival at BelGaN and received backing from a Chinese investment fund. Prosecutors are examining allegations spanning espionage, membership in a criminal group, misappropriation of corporate resources and unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information.

The investigation centers on potential unauthorized movement of specialized intellectual property and trade secrets pertaining to gallium nitride, or GaN, semiconductors. These chips find use in electric vehicles, aerospace applications and military equipment. The suspect has rejected the charges, according to the Financial Times. A second individual is also under investigation by authorities.

A failed chipmaker at the center

BelGaN ran a semiconductor manufacturing facility in Oudenaarde, Belgium, before entering bankruptcy in July 2024, resulting in the loss of more than 400 positions. The organization had aimed to establish the site as a continental center for GaN production, yet the initiative collapsed due to funding shortfalls, according to EUToday. The criminal inquiry surfaced from examinations into the company's financial failure. Authorities have executed multiple searches and confiscated storage devices and digital records currently undergoing examination.

Why GaN technology matters

Gallium nitride semiconductors function effectively at elevated voltages and frequencies compared to traditional silicon components. This capability renders them valuable in power electronics and specialized applications spanning vehicles, telecommunications, data centers, aerospace and defense sectors. The significance of the purported GaN technology transfer extends beyond a single company's losses. For European semiconductor firms, technical knowledge and production expertise carry strategic weight equivalent to physical manufacturing infrastructure.

The case also exposes a persistent security challenge: sensitive technological knowledge can depart an organization through personnel, business relationships and corporate ties rather than exclusively through cybersecurity breaches.

Europe's growing technology-security concerns

The probe reflects intensified European governmental oversight of Chinese participation in vital economic sectors. Belgium enacted foreign investment screening mechanisms in 2023 targeting critical domains including semiconductors, defense, aerospace and digital systems. Belgium's State Security Service has also cautioned regarding tactics termed "Copy to China," which entail attempts to acquire European technological capabilities or personnel expertise.

However, government bodies recognize the need to differentiate between lawful business and academic engagement and unlawful intelligence gathering. This distinction will prove increasingly vital for enterprises. Enhanced protective measures can safeguard proprietary assets, yet excessively stringent policies could hinder legitimate cross-border research initiatives and capital flows.

The allegations remain unproven in any judicial proceeding, and Belgian prosecutors have not disclosed the identity of the Chinese organization in question. The inquiry continues.

For semiconductor enterprises and research bodies, this matter demonstrates that intellectual property defense demands attention beyond cybersecurity infrastructure. Personnel vetting, conflict-of-interest assessments, monitoring of external corporate positions and protective frameworks surrounding proprietary research all function to mitigate risks from insiders.